Understanding This Article

Article 69 grants Commission its most powerful and intrusive investigatory tool—physical on-site inspections of VLOP/VLOSE premises and third-party locations, often called 'dawn raids' in competition law context. Addresses evidential challenge: sophisticated compliance violations may be hidden in digital systems, internal communications, algorithmic code, database configurations, and organizational practices that Article 67 information requests cannot fully uncover because providers control what documents they produce and may sanitize, withhold, or destroy incriminating evidence. Unannounced inspections with surprise element prevent evidence destruction, enable examination of systems in operational state, allow inspectors to access complete unfiltered records including materials providers wouldn't voluntarily disclose. Inspection powers extremely broad: enter any premises/land/transport, examine all records regardless of format (paper, digital, cloud), copy/extract documents, require system access and explanations, seal premises preventing evidence tampering. Targets algorithmic systems and technical infrastructure: Article 69(2)(d) empowers Commission to access IT systems, examine algorithm source code, review data-handling processes, require technical explanations—critical for investigating Article 27 recommender transparency, Article 35 algorithmic risk mitigation, Article 38 recommender system design. Procedural safeguards balance enforcement power with fundamental rights: DSC consultation requirement, judicial authorization when needed, national court proportionality review, clear decision requirements, sealing justifications—preventing arbitrary inspections while enabling legitimate investigations.

Inspection Scope and Powers - Paragraphs 1-2: Commission can inspect 'premises of VLOP/VLOSE provider or other persons referred to in Article 67(1)'—same broad third-party scope as information requests including auditors, service providers, business partners, anyone with relevant information. 'All necessary inspections' grants discretion to Commission determining inspection necessity based on investigation needs. Five specific powers (paragraph 2): (a) Premises entry—any business premises (offices, data centers, content moderation facilities), land (owned or leased property), means of transport (vehicles, aircraft, vessels if relevant to investigation); (b) Records examination—'books and other records irrespective of medium'—paper documents, digital files, databases, cloud storage, email systems, instant messaging, source code repositories, version control systems, backup archives; (c) Copying/extracting—'in any form'—photocopies, digital copies, forensic images of servers/devices, screenshots, photographs, printouts enabling offline analysis; (d) System access and explanations—most critical for VLOP investigations: 'access to IT system' means inspectors can examine servers, databases, algorithm deployment environments, content moderation tools, live operational systems; 'algorithms' access enables code review, parameter examination, training data inspection; 'data-handling' includes data flows, processing logic, storage architecture; 'explanations' requires technical staff to walk inspectors through systems describing functionality, design rationale, operational procedures; (e) Sealing power—can seal premises or records preventing access by provider while inspection ongoing or pending Commission analysis, prevents evidence destruction/alteration during multi-day inspections or between inspection and document review, requires justification and proportionality given business disruption.

DSC Consultation and Member State Assistance: Full Article 69 text (paragraphs 3-10) requires: Commission must consult DSC of establishment before deciding inspection providing opportunity for DSC input on investigation approach and proportionality; inspection decision must state subject matter/purpose/date/penalties for obstruction/judicial review rights; Member States must provide inspection assistance including coercive measures if provider refuses entry—national police or authorities can force premises access executing Commission decision; when inspection requires premises entry against will (anticipated resistance), Commission must obtain prior national judicial authorization protecting fundamental rights against arbitrary search; national judge verifies inspection decision authenticity and proportionality (not arbitrary or excessive) but cannot question necessity or review Commission's case assessment—limited procedural review not substantive investigation oversight; provider may refuse inspection without judicial authorization but then Commission obtains authorization for subsequent attempt; obstructing inspection triggers Article 74 fines (up to 1% turnover) and Article 76 periodic penalties compelling cooperation.