Article 48
Crisis protocols
Chapter 3
|
Additional Obligations for Very Large Platforms
|
📖 5 min read
1. The Board may recommend that the Commission initiate the drawing up, in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, of voluntary crisis protocols for addressing crisis situations, which shall be strictly limited to extraordinary circumstances affecting public security or public health.
2. The Commission shall encourage and facilitate the providers of very large online platforms, of very large online search engines and, where appropriate, the providers of other online platforms or of other online search engines, to participate in the drawing up, testing and application of those crisis protocols. The Commission shall aim to ensure that those crisis protocols include one or more of the following measures:
(a) prominently displaying information on the crisis situation provided by Member States' authorities or at Union level, or, depending on the context of the crisis, by other relevant reliable bodies;
(b) ensuring that the provider of the intermediary service designates a specific point of contact for crisis management;
(c) where applicable, adapting the resources dedicated to compliance with the obligations set out in Articles 16, 22 and 35 to the needs arising from the crisis situation.
3. The Commission shall, as appropriate, involve Member States' authorities, and may also involve Union bodies, offices and agencies in drawing up, testing and supervising the application of the crisis protocols. The Commission may, where necessary and appropriate, also involve civil society organisations or other relevant organisations in drawing up the crisis protocols.
4. The Commission shall aim to ensure that the crisis protocols set out clearly:
(a) the specific parameters to determine what constitutes the specific extraordinary circumstance that the crisis protocol seeks to address;
(b) the role of each participant and the measures that they are to put in place in preparation for, and once the crisis protocol has been activated;
(c) a clear procedure for determining when the crisis protocol is to be activated;
(d) a clear procedure for determining the period during which the measures to be taken once the crisis protocol has been activated are to be taken, which is to be strictly limited in time to what is necessary for addressing the specific extraordinary circumstances concerned;
(e) safeguards to address any negative effects on the exercise of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, in particular the freedom of expression and information and the right to non-discrimination;
(f) a clear procedure for regular reporting and review of the measures taken pursuant to the crisis protocol.
5. If the Commission considers that a crisis protocol fails to effectively address the crisis situation, or to safeguard the exercise of fundamental rights as referred to in paragraph 4, point (e), it shall request the participants to revise the crisis protocol, including by taking additional measures.
Understanding This Article
Article 48 establishes framework for voluntary crisis protocols enabling coordinated platform responses during extraordinary circumstances threatening public security or public health. The provision reflects recognition that certain crises require rapid, coordinated action across platforms beyond normal content moderation, but must be carefully bounded to prevent abuse justifying unjustified censorship or emergency powers.
The Board's role is recommendatory not mandatory: 'may recommend that the Commission initiate' protocol development. Board assesses whether crisis protocol needed based on: Recurring crisis types (e.g., terrorist attacks, pandemic outbreaks) where advance planning would improve response; Lessons from past crises revealing coordination gaps; Emerging threats requiring preparedness. Board recommendation triggers Commission facilitation process similar to other codes.
Strict limitation to 'extraordinary circumstances' guards against overuse. Recital 108 examples - armed conflicts, terrorism, natural disasters, pandemics - reflect truly exceptional events justifying extraordinary measures. This excludes routine content moderation (addressed through normal DSA obligations) or politically controversial situations not meeting extraordinary threshold. Limitation attempts to prevent crisis powers becoming regular governance tool.
Protocols serve distinct but complementary role to Article 36 crisis response mechanism. Article 36 enables Commission to require specific VLOPs/VLOSEs to take specific actions during crisis (assess whether services contribute to serious threat, apply mitigation measures, report to Commission). This is binding, top-down, reactive - Commission acts after crisis emerges. Article 48 protocols are voluntary, cooperative, proactive - platforms agree advance procedures to implement when crisis occurs. Benefits of voluntary protocols: Speed (pre-agreed protocols activate faster than negotiating Article 36 decisions), Breadth (protocols can involve non-VLOPs voluntarily joining broader coordination), Flexibility (protocols can include nuanced procedures difficult to mandate legally), Legitimacy (voluntary participation creates ownership and buy-in). However, voluntary nature means platforms could refuse participation or implementation during actual crisis.
Protocols should be 'tested' before crises - tabletop exercises, simulations, coordinated drills ensuring protocols work when needed. Testing identifies gaps, procedural issues, communication challenges before high-stakes crisis application.
Civil society has raised significant concerns about crisis protocols, particularly freedom of expression implications. Concerns include: Censorship risk - crisis justification could enable broad content removals suppressing legitimate information and criticism; Lack of safeguards - voluntary protocols may lack judicial review, appeals, and other due process protections binding measures would face; Vague triggers - 'extraordinary circumstances' could be interpreted expansively; Lack of transparency and oversight - protocol development and activation may lack public scrutiny and parliamentary oversight; Indefinite application - crisis measures might continue beyond actual emergency. These concerns led to civil society advocacy for strict safeguards: Narrow crisis definitions, Sunset clauses requiring renewal, Independent oversight, Transparency requirements, Appeals mechanisms, Parliamentary scrutiny.
Practical Application
For Platforms (Developing Crisis Response Capabilities): VLOPs and VLOSEs should develop crisis response capabilities regardless of formal protocols. Preparedness includes: (1) Crisis identification: Define what constitutes crisis requiring enhanced response (terrorism incidents, pandemic outbreaks, natural disasters with disinformation risks), Establish threshold criteria (severity, geographic scope, threat to public safety), Create escalation procedures. (2) Response procedures: Accelerated content review for crisis-related illegal content, Enhanced fact-checking partnerships during information crises, Coordinated action against coordinated inauthentic behavior exploiting crisis, Emergency information prominence giving authoritative sources visibility, Cross-platform communication for coordinated response. (3) Safeguards: Time limitations ensuring crisis measures temporary, Enhanced appeals for content removal during crisis, Transparency reporting on crisis measures taken, Post-crisis review evaluating proportionality and effectiveness. (4) Testing and training: Regular drills simulating crisis scenarios, Staff training on crisis procedures, Partnership testing with fact-checkers and authorities, Post-exercise evaluation improving protocols. Example: During COVID-19 pandemic, platforms implemented: Authoritative information promotion (WHO, national health authorities), Misinformation removal policies (dangerous health claims), Vaccine information campaigns, Coordinated fact-checking, Emergency features (video call limits relaxed for social connection). These responses demonstrated value of crisis preparedness while raising questions about scope and duration of emergency measures.